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This paper examines the influence of party change on party-level legislative turnover. Analyzing a novel dataset tracking
251 parties in eight West European democracies between 1945 and 2015, we assess how transformational party events
affect the renewal of parties’ parliamentary delegations. Transformational party events refer to party changes resulting
from deliberate strategic decisions that redistribute power within parties, change their identity, and/or shift alliances
within and between them. We focus in particular on changes in parties’ leadership and name, the formation of electoral
cartels, mergers and divisions, applying empirical methods suitable for dealing with fractional outcomes and multi-level
data to test their impact on turnover rates. Our estimates indicate that leadership change is a key determinant of MP
renewal, leading to systematically higher rates of legislative turnover. Party relabeling and divisions affect turnover as well,
although their influence is contingent on other characteristics of the parties and their environment.
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Introduction
The renewal of parliamentary delegations—or lack
thereof—affects core democratic tenets of political
accountability and representation, and has extensive impli-
cations for policy-making. Voters’ ability to punish elected
representatives at the ballot box encourages incumbents to
enact legislation aligned with the will of the people and
contributes to “discipline” MPs who might otherwise use
their power in their own—rather than citizens’—interest
(Matland and Studlar, 2004). Low turnover levels, how-
ever, render the threat of removal less credible and insulate
incumbents from shifts in public opinion, undermining
accountability (Matland and Studlar, 2004). Low turnover
may also prevent the voice of certain—less or newly
organized—segments of society (e.g. women, minorities)
from being expressed in the political arena and in public
policy (Somit et al., 1994), as well as hinder policy innova-
tion and creativity (Bratton and Ray, 2002). At the other
extreme, too much turnover may erode parliaments’ reser-
voir of expertise, shorten legislators’ horizon and breed
“short-termism,” all of which might undermine the quality
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of legislation and lead to sub-optimal policy outcomes
(Uppal and Glazer, 2015). It is important, therefore, to
identify the factors shaping legislative turnover and to
understand the mechanisms fostering or hampering the cir-
culation of legislative personnel.
In the last decades scholars have paid increasing atten-
tion to the drivers of legislative turnover outside of the
United States, where the majority of past studies is tradi-
tionally found (Gouglas et al., 2018; Matland and Studlar,
2004). Most of the literature has adopted a macro-level
perspective, taking the legislature or chamber as the unit
of analysis and assessing the influence of systemic—espe-
cially institutional (e.g. electoral systems) and electoral
(e.g. electoral volatility)—characteristics on aggregate
turnover rates. This approach has two main shortcomings.
First, it can lead to analytical and interpretation problems,
because such aggregate-level studies lump together effects
that could be divergent or even contradictory (François and
Grossman, 2015). Turnover may increase for some of the
parties in parliament and decrease for others, but these
opposite trends might cancel out when the analysis is con-
ducted at the aggregate level.
More importantly, this macro-level focus neglects the
fact that legislative turnover is affected not only by sys-
temic traits, but also by the characteristics and strategic
choices of the parties operating in such systems. In fact,
Salvati and Verseci (2018) show that turnover rates can
vary considerably irrespective of parties’ electoral perfor-
mance and contextual conditions. Analyzing the 2018
general election in Italy, the authors note for instance that
the Five Star Movement, which increased its support vis-
à-vis the previous election, experienced a large renewal
of its parliamentary delegation, but so did formations like
the Democratic Party and Forza Italia, which had suffered
considerable vote losses. To the extent that a large part of
the shifts in parties’ parliamentary delegations cannot be
accounted for by the usual macro-level explanatory fac-
tors, they argue, “the new frontier” in turnover research is
to be found in the analysis of intra-party factors. This
seems only natural, as political parties are deemed to be
“prime movers” (Pedersen, 2000) and a “major mechan-
ism” (Matland and Studlar, 2004) in the renewal of par-
liamentary elites—especially in non-US contexts. In spite
of this, virtually all applied research has failed to consider
the role of parties—and, in particular, of party change—
in shaping legislative turnover (François and Grossman,
2015).
Our aim is to “cross the frontier” of turnover research by
offering an empirical study of its determinants at the party
level. Our basic argument is that transformational party
events, defined by Harmel and Janda (1994: 227) as
“obtrusive” and “identifiable happenings” in the internal
life of parties, can have a profound impact on party legis-
lative turnover. Such transformations are the product of
deliberate and strategic decisions that redistribute power
within parties (Harmel and Janda, 1994), change their iden-
tity (Mair, 1989), and/or shift alliances among and across
parties (Panebianco, 1988). In particular, we focus on four
categories of transformational party events: leadership
change (Harmel and Janda, 1994); party relabeling (Kim
and Solt, 2017); the formation of permanent or transitory
inter-party coalitions, such as electoral cartels (Golder,
2006) and mergers (Ibenskas, 2016); and organizational
fissions (Ibenskas, 2020; Mair, 1990). We examine the
impact of these events on the renewal of the parliamentary
delegation of 251 parties in eight West European lower
chambers over a 70 year period.
Our article makes a three-fold contribution to legislative
turnover research. First, we theorize the link between trans-
formational party change and party legislative turnover.
Second, we fill an empirical gap in the literature by con-
ducting the analysis at a more disaggregated (party) level
and implementing a research design that is both interna-
tionally comparative and historically comprehensive.
Finally, our work is also methodologically innovative,
improving on prior work using linear regression models
to study the determinants of parliamentary renewal rates.
We apply multi-level augmented Bayesian beta regressions
and fractional logit models specifically designed to handle
percentages or proportions in order to estimate the impact
of party-level transformations on legislative turnover, after
accounting for other observed and unmeasured character-
istics of the organizations and of the environment in which
they operate.
Our analysis highlights three key findings. First, leader-
ship change is a key determinant of MP renewal, leading to
consistently higher rates of legislative turnover among
West European parties throughout the post-1945 era. Sec-
ond, party relabeling is also associated with higher legis-
lative turnover, but only for those organizations that have
the potential to shape policy outcomes. Third, party splits
have a sizable impact on the circulation of parliamentary
elites, once we account for other individual and systemic
factors: following a break-up, the main successor parties
witness an influx of new and re-entering MPs, while
renewal rates decline among the splinter groups emerging
from the division.
Theory and hypotheses
Party legislative turnover refers to the percentage of a
party’s legislative delegation that changes from one elec-
tion to the next. Following a general election, a party
parliamentary team comprises re-elected MPs, first-entry
MPs (who were elected for the first time), and former MPs
who, after a break of one or more terms, re-enter the
legislature. Party legislative delegations can also witness
the influx of incumbent MPs from another party who
decided to switch sides. Important as it might be, party
switching is a conceptually and theoretically distinct
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phenomenon that merits its own attention, and should not
be confused with the study of legislative turnover. There-
fore, by legislative turnover we mean here the renewal of
the legislative delegation of a party with first-entry MPs
(those with no previous legislative experience) and re-
entering MPs (former party MPs who re-enter the legis-
lature after a break of one or more terms).
The renewal of party MPs is the outcome of a process of
legislative elite recruitment in which political parties—
alongside contenders and voters—play a central role
(Cotta and Best, 2007; Gouglas et al., 2018; Norris,
1997). First, as incentive providers at the pre-selection
stage, parties can attract eligible citizens to run for office.
Second, as demanders of political personnel, they are
gatekeepers who decide who will be a candidate and who
will be placed in safe districts or in higher positions on the
party ballot. Third, at the time of elections, parties attract
voters and boost the electoral chances of their candidates
by providing them with resources and, more generally,
running election campaigns.
The way in which parties perform these roles is shaped
by their own political and institutional features, as well as
by the characteristics of the political system in which they
operate (Gouglas et al., 2018; Matland and Studlar, 2004).
Such politico-institutional traits—e.g. party ideology, can-
didate and leader selection procedures, electoral rules—
tend to be relatively invariant or modified only gradually
from one election to the next. This helps create institutio-
nalized equilibria during which legislative turnover rates
are “normalized” (Pedersen, 1994). Nevertheless, institu-
tionalized equilibria are occasionally disrupted by “sudden
and violent disturbances,” in the aftermath of which new
legislators storm into parliaments like a river that
“overflows its banks” (Pareto, 1935: 1431).
Past research on legislative turnover assumes that these
“disturbances” concern primarily environmental events
that parties cannot directly control, such as swings in voter
preferences (François and Grossman, 2015; Matland and
Studlar, 2004). Nonetheless, legislative turnover equilibria
can also be disrupted as a result of internal party changes
stemming from elites’ strategic decisions. Verzichelli
(2019), for instance, showed how leadership change in the
largest parties in European parliaments drives MP renewal
in the whole legislature. Kuklys (2013), in turn, argued that
the high rates of legislative renewal in the Baltics is asso-
ciated with a high occurrence of splits and mergers. By
contrast, Arian (1994) claimed that legislative elite stability
in the Israeli Knesset is positively correlated with party
mergers and negatively associated with party splits. These
authors, in sum, point to the potential influence of intra-
party change on legislative turnover.
Not every instance of intra-party change is—equally—
likely to shape the composition of parliamentary elites,
though. Harmel and Janda (1994: 277) distinguished three
types of “self-imposed” party changes: i) modifications,
understood as minor alterations in the rules and organiza-
tional routines of the party; ii) trends, i.e. incremental
changes in a specific direction that may, over the long run,
alter some characteristics of the party; and iii) events, con-
ceptualized as “obtrusive” and “identifiable happenings” in
the internal life of a party. While the former two instances
may produce evolutionary organizational change (Pane-
bianco, 1988), party events are the sort of “disturbances”
that can lead to what organizational theories refer to as
“transformational” change (Burke, 2018).
As noted in the Introduction, we identify four broad
categories of such transformational party events: changes
in leadership, name changes, the formation of temporary
(electoral cartels) or permanent (mergers) inter-
organizational coalitions, and party splits or divisions.
These transformational events are consequential for party
MP renewal, as they affect parties’ electoral appeal, their
ability to attract politicians willing to run for office, the
mechanisms by which parties select their candidates and
their strategic decisions concerning whose electoral
ambitions to support. Below we present six hypotheses
regarding the impact of each of these types of events on
party-level legislative turnover.
Changes in leadership
New party leaders are “power” and “goal motivated” actors
who try to consolidate their authority within the party,
usually bringing their own political priorities and methods
into the organization (Harmel and Janda, 1994). Such lead-
ership changes can have important consequences for the
renewal of party legislators. According to the leaderisa-
tion hypothesis proposed by Verzichelli (2019: 95), a new
leader is expected to bring “a sharp reshuffle in the par-
liamentary ranks,” often through the entry of a number of
newcomers close to the new leader’s circle combined with
a process of de-selection of the former party elite. This is
apparent for parties whose leaders centrally control can-
didate nominations, such as Lega Nord in Italy. But it can
also be the case for parties that widened participation
within the selectorate by introducing more open selection
methods (e.g. primaries), like OVP, SPÖ and the Greens
in Austria, most Belgian parties, the Conservatives,
Labour, and Liberal Democrats in the UK, and the Dem-
ocratic Party or the Five Star Movement in Italy. Even in
these cases, formal or procedural openness does not pre-
vent leaders from retaining instruments that allow them to
nominate candidates or veto party lists (Musella, 2015).
Moreover, Salvati and Vercesi (2018: 89) argue that more
inclusive selection methods can actually strengthen lead-
ers’ control over candidate nominations through what they
termed a “plebiscitary effect.” Based on these arguments,
we expect
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H1: Legislative turnover to be higher for parties that
changed their leader before an election than for those
that did not.
Party name change
Around a third of the political parties in Europe have chan-
ged their names since 1945 (Kim and Solt, 2017). Such
name changes are an attempt at rebranding that is often
accompanied by a shake-up of incumbents and a renewal
of legislative elites. Sometimes, name changes go hand in
hand with the appointment of new leaders. This was, for
instance, the case of the Belgian Green party, which after
its disappointing result in the 2003 federal election changed
its name—from Agalev to Groen!—as well as its leader-
ship. Building on hypothesis H1, we expect name changes
that take place simultaneously with shifts in leadership to
be associated with higher party-level turnover rates,
although the relative influence of the two transformational
events might be difficult to disentangle. Very often, though,
relabeling is the result of the party’s effort to signal a com-
mitment to “new appeals or promises” (Kim and Solt,
2017: 445) without a change of leader—e.g. the Swedish
Right party, renamed Moderate Coalition Party in 1969,
and many communist parties like the Left Party—Commu-
nist (VPK) in Sweden, relabeled Left Party (V) in 1990.
This is often associated with the influx of new candidates
who are seen as better able to represent the party’s new
promises. Finally, name changes can also reflect institu-
tional discontinuity in newly established or weakly institu-
tionalized parties (Kim and Solt, 2017)—e.g. the Italian
Union for Democrats for Europe (UDEUR), a small perso-
nalized party that changed its name three times since 1999.
Under these circumstances, the change in name may corre-
late with absence of a consolidated parliamentary elite and
high turnover rates due to increased candidate rotation.
Hence, in all cases we expect
H2: Parties that changed their name before an election to
exhibit higher rates of legislative turnover than those
that did not.
Electoral cartels
Another transformational party event takes place when par-
ties decide to form electoral coalitions or cartels, coordinat-
ing their campaign strategies instead of running for office
alone. These are temporary agreements between parties,
struck during the pre-electoral bargaining process with the
goal of boosting the electoral support of the—otherwise
independent—formations and enhancing their chances of
participating in government (Golder, 2006; Ibenskas,
2016). While such inter-organizational arrangements can
take various forms, one of the most common examples are
electoral cartels, by which parties agree to run under a
single name with joint lists and nomination agreements
(Golder, 2006). From the perspective of parliamentary
turnover, the immediate consequence of this kind of
arrangement is an agreement between incumbents to secure
the future of their party and their own political careers
(Arian, 1994), which leaves little space for legislative
renewal. We therefore expect
H3: Legislative turnover to be lower for parties that
were part of an electoral cartel than for those that were
not.
Party mergers
Unlike electoral cartels, which are transitory arrangements
that allow parties to maintain their separate identities,
mergers refer to the permanent fusion or integration of
several party organizations with the primary goals of boost-
ing the electoral appeal of the merged party and improving
its bargaining position in the process of coalition govern-
ment formation (Golder, 2006; Ibenskas, 2016).
These “marriages of convenience” (Ibenskas, 2016) usu-
ally lead to changes in candidate selection methods, which
may in turn affect the renewal of parties’ legislative dele-
gation (Barnea and Rahat, 2007). While some scholars con-
tend that mergers should open up candidate selection (Lees
et al., 2010), we expect mergers to curtail renewal “because
of the need to assure the actors involved that they will win
their share of the representation cake” (Barnea and Rahat,
2007: 392). Thus, following the merger the new formation
will seek to secure incumbency (e.g. by placing the incum-
bents of the predecessor parties at the top of the merged
party list or in safe seats), rather than to promote renewal. A
case in point is that of the Swiss People’s Party, formed
from the merger of the Farmers, Traders and Citizens Party
(BGB) and the Democratic Party, which saw a large drop in
turnover in 1971—the first election it contested—vis-à-vis
each of the two merging partners.
Our expectation is therefore that
H4: Parties that merged before an election will exhibit
lower rates of legislative turnover than formations that
did not arise from a merger process.
Party divisions
Party fissions represent a permanent change in alliances
among a party’s organizational actors. Divisions result in
the emergence of splinter formations that co-exist along-
side and compete against the divided mother party. The
divided mother or “rump” party is the main successor party,
the one “most continuous with respect to the original party
before fission in organizational terms” (Ibenskas, 2020:
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45). By contrast, a splinter party is a new formation set up
by—or with the help of—defectors from the mother party
that competes against the main successor organization
already in the next electoral cycle following the break-up
(Ibenskas, 2020; Mair, 1990). Importantly, compared to the
rump party, these defectors take only a fraction of the over-
all party resources with them.
Divisions can have important implications for the
renewal of the parliamentary delegation of both the rump
and the splinter parties. For the divided mother party, the
exodus of some of its legislators means that new candi-
dates need to be recruited to stand up for election and
replace departing incumbents. Because the mother party
is typically the major party, it usually enjoys an already
established organization, followership and a distinct
brand, and is able to withstand the electoral competition
after the split (Ibenskas, 2020). This means that the new
recruits have realistic chances of making it into parlia-
ment in the next election cycle, and the division is there-
fore likely to boost legislative renewal. A relevant
example here is the UK Labour party, which in the
1983 post-division general election witnessed a 20%
MP renewal rate despite losing almost 10% of its vote.
In other words,
H5: The rate of legislative turnover is expected to be
higher for divided mother parties than for organizations
that did not go through a division before an election.
The opposite should hold true for the splinter parties,
which include defectors from the mother organization—
incumbent legislators among them. The first priority of
these incumbents is to stay in parliament. The splinter
party, which they formed and control, prioritizes their sur-
vival by positioning them in the safest possible electoral
contests (e.g. in districts where the splinter party polls
well). Additionally, splinter formations are typically rela-
tively small, have weaker party identities and weaker roots
in society. Thus, they tend to attract limited electoral sup-
port (Ibenskas, 2020), which may discourage candidates
from joining the newly formed parties. Hence, growing
beyond their incumbency base immediately after the split
is usually challenging for these formations. This was the
case of the British SDP, which after its split from the
Labour party in 1981 only renewed one of its six MPs in
the following (1983) general election. Our final hypothesis
thus states that
H6: Legislative turnover should be lower for splinter
parties than for formations that did not experience a
split.




To test our theoretical expectations, we assembled a novel
dataset recording legislative turnover between 1945 and
2015 among all the parties and independent groupings
with a legislative delegation in the lower or unicameral
chambers of eight West European democracies: Austria,
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the UK.
Our choice of countries was driven both by methodolo-
gical and pragmatic considerations. Ideally, we would have
covered all West European parties with parliamentary rep-
resentation at any point during the seven decades under
study. This, however, would have made it impossible to
compile the detailed information necessary to rigorously
assess the impact on legislative turnover of the key factors
underscored in our theoretical framework. We thus opted to
maximize the variability of our dependent and explanatory
variables and to extend the temporal coverage of our anal-
ysis as far as possible, albeit at the cost of limiting its
geographical scope. Irish parties, for instance, were
excluded from our sample because none of them changed
its name during the period under consideration (Kim and
Solt, 2017). Similarly, name changes are quite infrequent
among German and Danish political parties compared to
their Austrian and Swedish counter-parts. Pre-electoral
coalitions are also relatively rare in Denmark vis-à-vis the
Netherlands (Golder, 2006), while a comprehensive exam-
ination of German parties posed additional difficulties due
to the country’s reunification process. Despite the limita-
tions in the geographical coverage of our study, our selec-
tion criteria provided us with a broad sample of 251 parties
and groupings that exhibit noticeable differences in their
transformational party events and in the—political, elec-
toral, institutional—context they faced, including estab-
lished and new parties, formations that took part in all
the post-war elections and others that where operational for
only a brief period.1
Our dependent variable is party legislative turnover,
measured as the number of first-entry and re-entering party





H1 New Leader (þ)
H2 New Name (þ)
H3 Electoral Cartel ()
H4 Merged Party ()
H5 Divided Mother Party (þ)
H6 Splinter Party ()
Note: The table reports the sign (in parenthesis) of the expected impact of
each explanatory variable on the rate of party-level legislative turnover.
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MPs relative to the number of legislative seats captured by
a party in a given election. Data on turnover was collected
from parliamentary registries and MP biographical profiles,
yielding a total of 18,151 first-entry and re-entering MPs
clustered by 1,359 party observations across the 155 gen-
eral elections held in the sample countries between 1945
and 2015. The average rate of party legislative turnover
following an election is 37.30%.
The independent variables of interest in our analysis
comprise measures for the transformational events
expected to influence legislative turnover at the party-
level (hypotheses H1—H6): New Leader, New Name, Elec-
toral Cartel, Merged Party, Divided Mother Party, and
Splinter Party. These are all operationalized as binary vari-
ables taking the value 1 if a party experienced a leadership
or name change, formed an electoral cartel, underwent a
merger process, continued as the main successor party after
a division or emerged as a splinter formation before any
given election, and 0 otherwise.
Our baseline model includes these covariates along with
party- and country-specific effects accounting for the
impact of other (unmeasured) characteristics of the organi-
zations and of the political system in which they operate, as
well as year-effects capturing common time shocks poten-
tially affecting legislative turnover among all the sample
parties.2
For robustness, we also estimated alternative specifica-
tions incorporating party- and system-level controls to this
baseline model. To assess whether the impact of changes in
leadership varied with the growing personalization of party
leadership, which started toward the end of the 1980s
(Blondel and Thiebault, 2013), we added a dummy for the
Post-1989 years and interacted it with New Leader.
Prior research has also shown that opportunities for Pol-
icy Influence are a major determinant of legislative recruit-
ment (e.g. Matthews, 1984). Hence, parties with the
potential to shape public policy will be in a better position
to retain incumbents and to attract new candidates than
those with little policy-making clout. Drawing on Ibenskas
(2020), we classified parties as having the potential for
strong Policy Influence if they occupied cabinet posts in
the national government or held at least 3% of the seats in
the lower chamber before an election; parties that did not
satisfy either criterion were not deemed to be in a position
to shape policy.3
Electoral Performance, measured as the difference in a
party’s vote share between the last two general elections,
captures the fact that fluctuations in electoral support may
shape the renewal of a party’s parliamentary elite for rather
mechanical reasons (François and Grossman, 2015; Mat-
land and Studlar, 2004).
Additionally, parties that are ideologically similar tend
to show similar recruitment patterns and “representational
programmes” (Cotta, 2007), which affects elite circulation
within legislatures. For instance, Matland and Studlar
(2004) and van Haute (2016) note that leftist and green
parties often implement mandatory rotation for their MPs
to ensure that legislators are in tune with the people they are
supposed to represent. Progressive parties are also espe-
cially prone to adopt affirmative action programs or quotas
that might similarly result in higher rates of renewal in their
parliamentary delegations (Matland and Studlar, 2004). To
account for the potential correlation between ideology and
legislative turnover, we use both a continuous measure of
parties’ Political Ideology based on party expert surveys,
and indicators for the following party families: Agrarian,
Communist/Socialist, Green/Ecologist, Social Democracy,
Liberal, Christian Democracy, Conservative and Right-
wing.4
We also control for Party Age, measured as the number
of terms a party has served in parliament since 1945. We
know from legislative turnover research that, as parties
grow older, the level of stability and institutional entrench-
ment increases, the consolidation of the party parliamen-
tary elite typically intensifies, and the process of elite
renewal diminishes (Ilonszki, 2007; Pedersen, 2000). Addi-
tionally, since small legislative delegations might exhibit
disproportionately high turnover rates (even if the number
of newcomers is extremely low), we include the Number of
MPs obtained by each party in any given election as
another party-level covariate.
Among the system-level controls we incorporate the
strength of Personal Vote and the District Magnitude, two
variables that have been found to affect legislative turnover
in prior research (Gouglas et al., 2018). The strength of the
personal vote, understood as the extent to which the elec-
toral system provides incentives for the candidate to seek
electoral support originating “in his or her personal quali-
ties, qualifications, activities and record” (Cain et al., 1984:
111), can limit the renewal of parties’ parliamentary dele-
gation. This is because party selectorates making candidate
choices will be less likely to replace proven incumbents
with newcomers if they perceive that the party’s electoral
success is contingent on the characteristics and reputation
of the individuals running for office (Matland and Studlar,
2004). Additionally, personal reputations offer protection
from electoral defeat in primaries and general elections
(Gouglas et al., 2018: 647). While much of the literature
on personal vote has focused on US elections, there is
evidence of a substantial personal vote in other countries
as well—Britain among them (Cain et al., 1984; Wood and
Norton, 1992).
Past work has also shown that district magnitude corre-
lates positively with incumbent exit, and thus with the share
of parliamentary newcomers. As noted by Gouglas et al.
(2018), incumbents tend to resign more often in larger
magnitude districts, as the costs of running campaigns and
the obstacles to constituency work become higher. More-
over, larger districts mean more marginal seats up for grabs
by non-incumbents following electoral swings (Matland
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and Studlar, 2004). Hence, other things equal, parties oper-
ating in systems with larger district magnitudes should
experience higher turnover rates than those embedded in
polities with a smaller average number of seats per district.
The Online supplemental material provides information
about variable definitions, coding, and sources.
Estimation approach
Because the values of our dependent variable lie in the
interval [0, 1], linear regression models typically used in
the analysis of legislative turnover can lead to misleading
conclusions by ignoring the range constraints in the out-
come (Galvis et al., 2014). To address this problem, Ferrari
and Cribari-Neto (2004) developed a beta regression to
model rates or proportions. However, since the beta support
lies in the open interval (0, 1), it is ill-suited for our appli-
cation: legislative turnover is either 0% or 100% in more
than a quarter of the observations (party-years) in our
sample.
To account for such instances of null and full turnover,
we explicitly model the probabilities of occurrence of zeros
and ones through an augmented beta regression model:
f ðYi;j;t ¼ yi;j;tÞ ¼
p0i;j;t if yi;j;t ¼ 0
p1i;j;t if yi;j;t ¼ 1








where Yi;j;t denotes the legislative turnover rate for party
i in country j at time t; p0i;j;t is the probability that
Yi;j;t ¼ 0; p1i;j;t is the probability that Yi;j;t ¼ 1; and
f Yi;j;t¼ yi;j;tjmi;j;t;f
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is the probability density of a beta
random variable with mean mi;j;t and precision f. The
probabilities p0i;j;t, p
1
i;j;t and the mean mi;j;t are modeled as
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party, country and year random effects accounting for
unobserved cross-sectional and temporal heterogeneity.
We must note that the augmented beta regression is not
the only technique suitable for modeling proportions or
rates. The fractional logit model developed by Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) offers an alternative approach that exhi-
bits similar performance when dealing with single-level
(i.e., non-hierarchical) data (Meaney and Moineddin,
2014). However, fractional logit models are fitted using
quasi-likelihood methods, relying on asymptotic approxi-
mations that are unlikely to be met given the small number
of countries in our study (Maas and Hox, 2005). By con-
trast, recent work (e.g. Gelman, 2006) has shown that
Bayesian inferential methods such as those proposed by
Galvis et al. (2014) to fit the augmented beta regression
model yield accurate estimates for hierarchical models with
fewer than 10 clusters.
Hence, the results reported in the next section were
obtained from augmented beta regression models estimated
via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations.
Nonetheless, we replicated the analysis using fractional
logit models. As we show in the Online supplemental mate-
rial, the main findings are similar under both approaches,
reinforcing our confidence in the robustness of our results
and in the validity of our conclusions.
Results
Table 2 reports the “marginal effects” of the covariates on
the rate of party-level legislative turnover after a given
election. These values can be interpreted as the expected
(average) change in the proportion of first-entry and re-
entering MPs for the mean sample party associated with a
change in each predictor, holding all other regressors fixed
at their observed values.
The first column presents the results from our bench-
mark specification. Only two of the explanatory variables
of interest have a systematic influence on the renewal of
parties’ parliamentary delegations: New Leader and New
Name. The proportion of first-entry and re-entering MPs is
almost 5 percentage points higher on average for parties
that changed their leadership before an election than for
those that did not do so, as stated in hypothesis H1. Hypoth-
esis H2 finds confirmation in the data as well: the rate of
legislative turnover is 3.66 percentage points higher for
parties that changed name before an election than for those
that did not attempt such rebranding. On the other hand, our
baseline estimates provide little support for hypotheses
H3—H6: the marginal effects of Electoral Cartel, Merged
Party, Divided Mother Party and Splinter Party are all
statistically indistinguishable from zero. The same conclu-
sion holds for the fractional logit model (Online supple-
mental material, Table S.6).
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Column (2) explores how the effect of New Leader
changed with the growing personalization of party lead-
ership. While the estimate for Post 1989 shows that leg-
islative turnover for the average sample party increased
markedly after 1989, the marginal effect of New Leader is
only somewhat higher (4.56%) than in the pre-1989
period (4.33%), and this difference is not statistically
significant. In consonance with the “iron law of
leadership” (Musella, 2015), these findings highlight the
substantive and stable influence of leaders on the renewal
of parties’ legislative delegations since the end of the
Second World War.
The next two columns report marginal effects estimated
by separately fitting our baseline model to parties with
(column 3) and without (column 4) strong potential for
Policy Influence. Hypothesis H1 continues to hold for both
groups of parties: the marginal effect of New Leaders is
positive and highly significant in the two sub-samples. On
the other hand, name changes only have a systematic influ-
ence on turnover among formations likely to shape policy.
This suggests that parties with little policy-making clout,
which tend to be comparatively less institutionalized, do
not have sufficient “brand equity” for a name change to
attract new—successful—candidates and substantially alter
the composition of their legislative delegation. Instead,
relabeling seems to be barely enough to allow such parties
to survive and their incumbents to be re-elected into office.
As in our baseline model, none of the other explanatory
variables has a systematic impact on the proportion of new
and re-entering MPs, irrespective of parties’ policy-making
potential.
Figure 1 summarizes the results from models assessing
the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of party- and
country-level controls. Changes in leadership and name
remain systematically associated with the renewal of par-
ties’ legislative delegation. Additionally, the marginal
effects of Divided Mother Party and Splinter Party become
significant after controlling for other covariates, providing
some support for hypotheses H5 and H6. Once we account
for other individual and systemic influences on legislative
turnover, the proportion of new and re-entering MPs fol-
lowing a split is about 5 percentage points higher for the
main successor party and 5 points lower for splinter forma-
tions vis-à-vis parties that did not break up.
In line with prior research, the signs of the controls in
Figure 1 indicate that, for the average sample party, legis-
lative turnover increases following elections in which it
improved its Electoral Performance, and decreases with
Table 2. Marginal effects of the predictors on party-level legislative turnover.
Variable
Models










New Leader 4.79*** 3.34*** 7.71***
(0.96) (1.04) (1.80)
New Leader—Until 1989 4.33***
(1.49)
New Leader—Post 1989 4.56***
(1.16)
New Name 3.66** 3.28* 4.04** 3.67
(1.87) (1.95) (2.05) (3.70)
Electoral Cartel 1.55 1.20 0.37 2.73
(1.87) (2.02) (2.40) (4.00)
Merged Party 0.35 0.64 -0.34 1.10
(2.48) (2.51) (1.90) (2.70)
Divided Mother Party -1.03 -0.90 -1.49 -0.33
(2.50) (2.57) (2.80) (3.10)
Splinter Party -1.35 -1.08 -0.89 -2.25
(2.30) (2.34) (3.16) (2.40)
Post 1989 5.38***
(1.58)
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.46 0.33 0.58
Likelihood ratio test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N. observations 1,359 1,359 557 802
Note: The table reports posterior means and standard errors—in parentheses—for the marginal effect of each variable on party-level legislative
turnover, in percentage points. To facilitate the comparison with fractional logit models, we also display “significance” levels: *** at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.
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the size of its parliamentary delegation and its age.5
Although the marginal effect of Party Ideology is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero, the proportion of new
and re-entering MPs varies systematically across party
families. Specifically, turnover is systematically higher for
Green parties—in accordance with van Haute (2016). Inter-
estingly, our supplementary results (Online supplemental
material) indicate that ideology also intervenes between
transformational events and the renewal of parties’ parlia-
mentary elites. In particular, the significant positive rela-
tionship between Divided Mother Party and legislative
turnover and the negative association between the outcome
and Splinter Party found after controlling for other covari-
ates seem to be entirely driven by social democratic, liberal
and conservative parties. This suggests that variations in
turnover across party families may be greater than the
previous literature—which largely ignored these moderat-
ing effects—assumed.6
The estimates for the system-level controls are in agree-
ment with Gouglas et al. (2018): on average, a stronger
Personal Vote significantly reduces the renewal of parties’
parliamentary delegation, while a higher District Magni-
tude is associated with a higher average proportion of new
and re-entering MPs—although this marginal effect is not
statistically significant.
In sum, hypotheses H1 and H2 are decidedly backed by
our empirical analysis. All the specifications confirm that
the proportion of new and re-entering MPs is systematically
higher for parties that changed their leadership than for
those that did not go through a similar transformational
event. Similarly, party relabeling drives turnover rates up,
although this result is mainly due to the behavior of parties
Figure 1. Marginal effects of the covariates estimated from models including party- and system-level controls. Note: The figure plots
the average change in party-level legislative turnover associated with a change in each predictor, estimated from models incorporating
party-level (left panel) and party- and system-level (right panel) controls. Solid circles represent posterior means, in percentage points;
horizontal lines give 90% highest posterior density intervals.
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with the potential to shape policy. Although the evidence in
favor of hypotheses H5 and H6 is less conclusive, Figure 1
reveals that legislative turnover is higher (lower) for
divided mother parties (splinter parties) than for formations
that did not experience a split before an election, once we
control for other variables affecting parliamentary renewal.
Similar conclusions hold using fractional logit models
(Online supplemental material).
Concluding remarks
This paper examined the relationship between transforma-
tional party events (Harmel and Janda, 1994) and party-
level legislative turnover. Using empirical methods that
account for range constraints in the outcome and for the
hierarchical nature of our data, we tested the impact of
leadership and name changes, electoral coalitions, mergers
and divisions on the renewal of the parliamentary delega-
tions of 251 parties across eight west European democra-
cies between 1945 and 2015.
Our first key result concerns the role of party leaders.
Our analysis provides support for the notion of an “iron law
of leadership” (Musella, 2015), according to which new
leaders have ample influence on their parties’ legislative
delegations. The arrival of a new leader is consistently
followed by an influx of newcomers in parliament, regard-
less of the influence that other factors—like electoral per-
formance—may exert on legislative turnover. The case of
the Swedish Right Party (Högerpartiet) helps illustrate this
point. The party appointed a new leader in 1961 and went
on to renew almost half of its legislative delegation after the
next (1964) general election, despite suffering a 2.9% drop
in its vote-share and losing seven seats.
Our estimates for New Leader also lend some credence
to Verzichelli’s (2019) leaderisation hypothesis—which
had so far been tested for major parties only—but at the
same time cast some doubts about the significance of the
growing personalization of party leadership on party MP
renewal once both major and minor parties are included in
the analysis. Although the results in Table 2 (column 2)
indicate that the impact of New Leader on party-level turn-
over became somewhat stronger after 1989, when the trend
toward personalization started (Blondel and Thiebault,
2013), this effect is quite modest. This finding also chal-
lenges to some extent the notion that there are two eras of
party leadership: one of party oligarchies before 1989, dur-
ing which the central party controlled the party leader; and
a second, post-1980s era of personalized leadership, when
the leader controls both the central party and the party on
the ground (Blondel and Thiebault, 2013; Katz, 2001).
While personalistic leaders might have been on the rise
since the end of the 1980s, our analysis shows that new
leaders have always been important, at least when it comes
to the control of parties’ parliamentary delegations.
Besides the appointment of new leaders, name changes
and party divisions affect turnover rates as well. Unlike the
marginal effect of leadership changes, though, the impact
of these transformational events is contingent on other
characteristics of the parties and their environment. In this
sense, our results indicate that party relabeling is associated
with higher rates of MP renewal, but only among forma-
tions that have the potential to influence policy. This is a
novel finding not only for the literature on legislative turn-
over—which has devoted virtually no attention to the
impact of political marketing on the renewal of parliamen-
tary delegations—but also for the more general research on
party brands and the consequences of party relabeling (Kim
and Solt, 2017). As for party splits, our estimates indicate
that the rate of legislative turnover tends to increase for the
main successor organizations but declines for splinter
groups. Nonetheless, this result only holds after controlling
for other drivers of MP renewal.
Altogether, our paper provides a first attempt to rigor-
ously assess the impact of intra-party change on MP renewal.
More generally, ours is one of the few studies that system-
atically explore the relationship between party-specific fea-
tures and legislative turnover (Francois and Grossman, 2015;
Salvati and Verseci, 2018). Although this is valuable as a
first step, we still know relatively little about how the defin-
ing attributes of parties affect the composition of their par-
liamentary delegations. Hence, additional investigation is
required to further understand the link between individual
party traits and legislative turnover.
In this direction, our analysis suggests that the role of
ideology might have been under-estimated by extant
research. Although past studies have pointed to the existence
of differential rates of legislative turnover across party fam-
ilies, most of these analyses have either been merely descrip-
tive (Cotta and Best, 2007) or focused on a subset of large
parties (Gouglas et al., 2018; Matland and Studlar, 2004;
Verzichelli, 2019). Moreover, they have considered only the
direct influence of party families on average turnover rates.
Our preliminary results indicate that ideology also condi-
tions the impact of transformational party events—and pos-
sibly of other party characteristics—on MP renewal. These
initial findings imply that there may be significant intra-
party family dynamics affecting the stability and renewal
of parliamentary elites. We leave a thorough examination
of these dynamics for future work.
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Notes
1. The Online supplemental material provides information about
the elections and parties in our study.
2. Some of these predictors could in principle be closely corre-
lated, raising concerns about potential multicollinearity. For
instance, party splits and mergers are often associated with
name changes, while splinter parties necessarily have new
leaders. We must note, though, that more than 70% of the
sample parties that changed their name did not experience
either a merger or a split, while splinter parties accounted for
less than 10% of all the changes in leadership. More impor-
tantly, different diagnostic tests reported in the Online supple-
mental material reveal no collinearity problems in our data.
3. We experimented with alternative operationalizations of this
variable, with little change in the results (see Online supple-
mental material).
4. The reference category comprises single issue parties and
those not belonging to any family.
5. As we show in the Online supplemental material, the marginal
effect of Party Age on legislative turnover becomes more neg-
ative over time, consistent with Pedersen (2000) and Ilonszki
(2007).
6. As discussed in the concluding section, we will examine these
variations in greater detail in future work.
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